Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Financial Integrity Monitor

Morocco MA

Domains (D1–D6)
3
Sources
8
Role actions
8
Horizon <90d
1
Jurisdiction profile
CompliantTier BRisk: StableMixed

Morocco's AML/CFT regime rests on Law 43-05 (as amended by Law 12-18) with UTRF (Unité de Traitement du Renseignement Financier) as FIU using goAML.

MoreRemoved from FATF grey list in Feb 2023; remains in MENAFATF enhanced follow-up with 39/40 Recommendations rated C/LC as of the 2024 follow-up cycle, but structural gaps persist on cash couriers, beneficial ownership, and virtual assets.

Key deficiencies
  • Recommendation 32 (cash couriers) remains only partially compliant; no effective cross-border currency/BNI declaration and interdiction system given a large informal, cash-based economy
  • Beneficial ownership public register decreed but electronic platform not fully populated/operational; nominee shareholder/director misuse not adequately mitigated
  • No operative virtual asset/VASP licensing regime despite a 2017 central-bank prohibition being widely disregarded in practice
  • Recommendation 38 (MLA freezing/confiscation) rated partially compliant; slow, non-time-bound response mechanisms to foreign freezing/confiscation requests
  • DNFBP supervision (lawyers, notaries, accountants, real estate) fragmented across multiple authorities with inconsistent risk-based application
Recent developments (18m)
  • MENAFATF continued Morocco in Enhanced Follow-Up; 6th Enhanced Follow-Up Report due to the 40th MENAFATF Plenary (May 2025), with FATF's Morocco follow-up page carrying a 'latest update: December 2025' revision
  • Bearer shares in Moroccan joint-stock companies prohibited from issuance and existing bearer shares required to convert to registered shares, aimed at closing a legal-entity opacity gap identified in Morocco's Mutual Evaluation
  • EU Commission's December 2025 high-risk third-country list update left Morocco off the list while Algeria (added June 2025) and other MENA neighbours were listed, widening the divergence within the region
  • European Court of Justice ruling (October 2024) invalidating elements of the EU-Morocco trade/fisheries protocols over Western Sahara-origin goods; a replacement protocol was provisionally applied from 3 October 2025, with implications for certificate-of-origin integrity and TBML exposure
Brief

Lead signal

Lead Signal

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Lead Signal

Morocco this cycle registers two structurally distinct but related developments: continued drafting progress on a crypto-asset licensing regime, and the formal launch of the third-round mutual evaluation that will test whether the jurisdiction's technical-compliance standing holds up under an effectiveness lens through May 2028. Bank Al-Maghrib confirmed it has continued work since 2025 on finalizing Draft Bill 42.25, the long-awaited crypto-asset legislation intended to bring an estimated six million informal crypto users under a licensing, capital and governance regime; the bill remains unenacted. Separately, MENAFATF formally launched Morocco's third mutual-evaluation cycle via a high-level Presidency visit on 27 November 2025, a process that will extend until May 2028. The two threads intersect directly: Morocco sits off the FATF increased-monitoring list since 2023 and is rated Largely Compliant or Compliant on most Recommendations, but is Non-Compliant on Recommendation 15, which covers virtual assets. The mutual evaluation now underway will measure whether the jurisdiction converts that technical standing into demonstrated effectiveness, with the crypto-asset gap as a visible test case.

The structural read is one of capacity lagging behind practice. The current legal posture on crypto-assets traces to a 2017 exchange-control warning, not a supervisory licensing framework; the eight-year interval between that warning and todays estimated informal user base illustrates how an enforcement gap can persist even where there is no permissive policy choice behind it, only a drafting delay. Draft Bill 42.25 was published by the Ministry of Economy and Finance in November 2025, and Bank Al-Maghribs confirmation of continued work points to the legislation still moving, not stalled, but it has not reached enactment and no date earlier than 2027 is indicated.

Other Developments

An OFAC SDN designation carries a Moroccan nationality nexus. The OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list, in a snapshot dated 2 October 2026, carries an individual with place of birth in Marrakech and Moroccan nationality, designated under Executive Order 13224 as amended, in connection with an IRGC-Qods Force network. This is a designation-nexus finding rather than a Moroccan state sanctions-evasion architecture: it says something about an individuals nationality and birthplace on a US list, not about Moroccan state conduct or a Moroccan-origin sanctions programme.

Morocco continues to operate without an autonomous sanctions list. The jurisdiction implements United Nations Security Council sanctions measures only, with no independent Moroccan listing mechanism layered on top. This is a standing structural feature of the sanctions architecture rather than a new development, and it means any divergence between UN measures and the autonomous lists maintained by the EU, UK or US falls outside Moroccos own sanctions perimeter by design.

The mutual evaluation clock has formally started. MENAFATFs Presidency delegation visit on 27 November 2025 marked the official launch of the third-round evaluation, with the AMMCs 2026 priority-actions document independently confirming the end-2025 launch date. The evaluation will extend to May 2028, when a final report is due for discussion and adoption, giving the jurisdiction a multi-year window in which effectiveness findings, including on virtual assets, will be tested against the technical-compliance ratings already achieved.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The crypto-asset drafting delay connects most directly to compliance-technology and digital-asset monitors elsewhere in the fleet: a licensing regime that introduces capital, governance and white-paper requirements for crypto-asset service providers and issuers will, once enacted, create a new compliant population that did not previously exist in supervised form, with onboarding and screening implications for institutions serving that population. The OFAC designation-nexus finding is relevant to sanctions-screening and politically exposed person monitoring across any institution with Moroccan-nationality customer exposure, independent of Moroccan state action. The mutual-evaluation launch is the kind of structural, multi-year process that other jurisdiction-risk and enabler-jurisdiction trackers elsewhere in the fleet should anchor to as a dated milestone, since its May 2028 endpoint will produce an effectiveness verdict that re-rates the jurisdictions standing beyond the technical-compliance scores already on record.

Outlook

Two dated markers now frame Moroccos financial-integrity trajectory. Draft Bill 42.25 is not expected to reach enactment before 2027 at the earliest, as scheduled per the current drafting timeline, which leaves the eight-year-old informal crypto market operating under the 2017 exchange-control warning for at least one more cycle. The MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation, running through May 2028, will be the more consequential marker: it will test whether Moroccos Largely Compliant and Compliant technical ratings translate into demonstrated effectiveness, with the standing Non-Compliant finding on Recommendation 15 as a specific pressure point that the eventual enactment of Bill 42.25 could help address, though the two processes are formally independent and the Bills passage is not a precondition the evaluation imposes.

weekly_brief_draft · JID MA
Domain intelligence (D1–D6)

D1 Sanctions Architecture and Evasion

Sanctions Architecture and Evasion

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Moroccos sanctions architecture this cycle shows no new state-level action but carries one designation-nexus finding and one reaffirmation of standing structure. An OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list snapshot dated 2 October 2026 carries an individual with place of birth in Marrakech and Moroccan nationality, designated under Executive Order 13224 as amended, in connection with an IRGC-Qods Force network. This is best read as a designation-nexus finding rather than a Moroccan sanctions-evasion architecture finding: the designation attaches to an individuals nationality and birthplace as recorded on a US list, and does not describe conduct by the Moroccan state, a Moroccan financial institution, or a Moroccan-domiciled entity. Institutions with Moroccan-nationality customer exposure, correspondent relationships, or beneficiary chains touching Morocco should read this as a screening-relevant data point rather than as evidence of a jurisdictional sanctions-evasion channel running through Morocco itself.

The second, standing element of the architecture is structural rather than incident-driven: Morocco has no autonomous sanctions list of its own and implements United Nations Security Council sanctions measures only. This means the jurisdiction does not independently mirror EU, UK or US autonomous listings, and any gap between those regimes and the UN baseline falls outside Moroccos own sanctions perimeter by design, not by omission. This is not evidence of permissiveness in the enforcement sense; it is a description of a jurisdiction that has chosen a narrower, UN-anchored sanctions implementation model, and that choice is relevant to how counterparties and correspondent banks should calibrate expectations about what a Moroccan sanctions screen can and cannot be expected to catch relative to autonomous-list jurisdictions.

Reading the two findings together, the architecture-over-incident lens suggests that the more durable fact for compliance purposes is the structural one: a UN-only implementation model, not a single designation. The designation itself is dated and bounded to the individual named; the UN-only posture is a standing condition that will continue to shape screening calibration for Moroccan-nexus relationships regardless of any single designation event. Three-pillar balance is also worth noting here: this cycles only sanctions-relevant finding sits on the CTF side of the ledger (screening against a terrorism-related designation), with no AML or CPF-specific sanctions development surfacing from the available substrate.

Outlook

No near-term change to Moroccos sanctions architecture is indicated by the current substrate. The UN-only implementation model is a standing structural condition with no scheduled review surfaced this cycle, and the OFAC designation is a bounded, individual-level event rather than the opening move of a broader pattern as far as the available evidence shows. The more consequential sanctions-adjacent marker on the horizon is not a sanctions development at all but the MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation running through May 2028, which will test AML/CTF effectiveness more broadly and could, depending on its findings, touch on the adequacy of sanctions-screening controls as part of that wider effectiveness assessment. Institutions with Moroccan-nexus exposure should treat the UN-only sanctions posture as the baseline assumption for calibration purposes until a dated change to that posture is recorded.

D2 Beneficial Ownership

Not covered

Beneficial Ownership is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D3 Enabler Jurisdictions

Not covered

Enabler Jurisdictions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D4 Conflict Finance

Not covered

Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D5 Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

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Moroccos crypto-asset regulatory track shows continued forward movement without enactment. Bank Al-Maghrib confirmed that it has continued its work since 2025 on finalizing Draft Bill 42.25, the long-awaited crypto-asset legislation, described as intended to bring an estimated six million informal crypto users, roughly sixteen percent of the population, under a licensing, capital and governance regime. The bill was published by the Ministry of Economy and Finance in November 2025 and remains, as at this cycle, unenacted. The regulatory horizon substrate places the earliest expected impact date at 2027, with a multi-year uncertainty band, and the primary source for the draft text sits with the Secretariat-General of the Government rather than with a legislature that has acted on it.

The architectural significance of this development outweighs its incident value. The current binding instrument governing crypto-assets in Morocco remains a 2017 exchange-control warning, a restriction-based posture rather than a licensing or supervisory framework. The eight-year gap between that warning and todays estimated informal user base is itself the more analytically significant fact: it demonstrates that an enforcement gap can persist for years even where the underlying intent is eventually to regulate rather than to permit indefinitely. Draft Bill 42.25, once enacted, would replace that exchange-control-era instrument with a prior-approval licensing regime for crypto-asset service providers and issuers, carrying capital, governance, white-paper and market-abuse-style requirements that do not presently exist in Moroccan law. That gap is also reflected in Moroccos formal FATF standing: the jurisdiction is rated Non-Compliant on Recommendation 15, the virtual-assets recommendation, even as it holds Largely Compliant or Compliant ratings on most other Recommendations and sits off the FATF increased-monitoring list since 2023.

A note on evidentiary weight is warranted here: the substrate for this cycles crypto-bill finding rests on a single Tier 3 press report, corroborated by secondary legal commentary, without independent retrieval of the primary Secretariat-General text this pass. The claim is accordingly carried at a Probable confidence tier rather than Confirmed, and the prose above reflects that tier rather than asserting enactment or a firm timeline beyond what Bank Al-Maghrib itself stated.

Outlook

Draft Bill 42.25 is not expected to reach enactment before 2027 at the earliest, as scheduled per the drafting timeline Bank Al-Maghrib has described, and the multi-year uncertainty band attached to that estimate means firms operating in or toward the Moroccan crypto-asset space should not assume a fixed enactment date. The Non-Compliant Recommendation 15 finding gives the bill a direct FATF-effectiveness stake: enactment would be the clearest available route to closing that specific gap, though the ongoing MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation, running through May 2028, is formally independent of the bills legislative timeline and could report before the bill is enacted. Firms with Moroccan crypto-asset exposure should treat the current 2017 exchange-control-era posture as the operative baseline until a dated enactment is recorded, rather than anticipating the licensing regime the draft bill describes.

D6 Compliance Technology & Active Defence

Not covered

Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D7 AML/CTF Regime

AML/CTF Regime

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Moroccos AML/CTF regime enters a defined multi-year evaluation window this cycle. MENAFATFs Presidency delegation conducted a high-level visit on 27 November 2025 to formally launch the jurisdictions third-round mutual evaluation, a process that will extend until May 2028, when a final report is due for discussion and adoption. The AMMCs own 2026 priority-actions document independently confirms that the end of 2025 saw the official launch of this third evaluation cycle, corroborating the MENAFATF source from a Moroccan regulatory-authority perspective rather than relying on the international-body account alone.

The structural backdrop against which this evaluation will be read is Moroccos existing technical-compliance standing: the jurisdiction exited the FATF increased-monitoring, or grey, list in 2023, and is rated Largely Compliant or Compliant on most FATF Recommendations. The one documented exception is Recommendation 15, covering virtual assets, where Morocco carries a Non-Compliant rating. The third-round evaluation is explicitly an effectiveness-focused exercise, distinct from the technical-compliance ratings already on record, meaning it will test whether Moroccos AML/CTF controls actually function as intended in practice rather than simply whether the right legal instruments exist on paper. This distinction matters for the three-pillar balance point: a jurisdiction can hold strong technical-compliance marks on AML while an effectiveness review surfaces gaps that enforcement-volume statistics alone would not reveal, and CTF and CPF effectiveness in particular are the areas most likely to be structurally under-weighted relative to AML enforcement activity when only technical ratings are consulted.

The Recommendation 15 gap connects directly to this regimes other live development, the unenacted crypto-asset bill: a jurisdiction cannot straightforwardly achieve a Compliant effectiveness rating on virtual-asset-related money laundering and terrorist financing risk while the underlying licensing and supervisory framework for virtual-asset service providers remains in draft form. The evaluation window running to May 2028 gives Morocco a defined, multi-year period in which the bills eventual enactment, if it occurs within that window, could materially improve the evidentiary picture available to evaluators; conversely, continued delay would leave the Non-Compliant finding as a visible, dated gap during the evaluation itself.

Outlook

The MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation, running through May 2028, is the defining AML/CTF marker on Moroccos horizon for the coming cycles. No interim milestone before the final report is specified in the available substrate, so the appropriate posture for now is to treat the evaluation as an open, multi-year process rather than to anticipate interim findings. The clearest connected risk is that the Recommendation 15 Non-Compliant finding on virtual assets remains unresolved at the time of evaluation if Draft Bill 42.25 has not been enacted by then; the two processes are legally independent, and the mutual evaluation does not require the bills passage as a precondition, but the final reports treatment of virtual-asset effectiveness will likely reference whatever legislative state the bill is in as at the evaluation date.

D8 Commercial Activity

Not covered

Commercial Activity is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

Regulatory horizon
Consultation2027 · ±multi_year

Draft Law 42.25 on crypto-assets

A prior-approval licensing regime for crypto-asset service providers and issuers, with capital, governance and risk-control standards, would replace the current exchange-control-based 2017 warning as the binding instrument.
1 dated · 4 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05
Role action cards
MLRO

MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation of Morocco formally launched, running through May 2028, with a standing Non-Compliant finding on virtual assets as a visible gap.

The evaluation tests AML/CTF effectiveness rather than only technical-compliance ratings, and the Recommendation 15 virtual-assets gap intersects directly with the still-unenacted crypto-asset bill, meaning SAR and typology coverage for Moroccan-nexus virtual-asset activity should not assume a licensing framework is yet in force.

3 evidence refs
Compliance

Draft Bill 42.25 remains unenacted while an estimated six million informal crypto users operate outside a licensing perimeter.

Policy and control frameworks addressing Moroccan crypto-asset exposure should continue to treat the 2017 exchange-control warning as the operative instrument rather than anticipating the draft licensing regime, given no enactment date earlier than 2027 is indicated.

2 evidence refs
Legal

An OFAC SDN designation carries a Moroccan-nationality nexus distinct from any Moroccan state sanctions action.

The designation attaches to an individuals nationality and birthplace rather than to Moroccan state or institutional conduct, which is relevant to how counsel frames client-instruction risk and secondary-sanctions exposure questions tied to Moroccan-nexus relationships.

2 evidence refs
Board

Morocco enters a multi-year MENAFATF effectiveness evaluation while its crypto-asset licensing framework remains in draft.

Strategic-level regulatory change is on a multi-year horizon in both tracks, with the evaluations May 2028 endpoint and the bills earliest 2027 impact date both material to planning around Moroccan market exposure.

2 evidence refs
CTO

A prior-approval licensing regime for crypto-asset service providers in Morocco remains in draft with no enactment before 2027 at the earliest.

Technical architecture decisions for platforms serving Moroccan crypto-asset users should not assume a licensing or supervisory API/reporting obligation is imminent, though the draft bills capital, governance and white-paper requirements indicate the eventual shape of compliance-technology integration once enacted.

1 evidence refs
Risk

A structural capacity gap between an eight-year-old crypto-asset warning and a six-million-user informal market persists as the draft licensing bill remains unenacted.

This is a structural, not episodic, risk concentration in Moroccan crypto-asset exposure, compounded by the standing Non-Compliant Recommendation 15 rating that the ongoing mutual evaluation will test directly.

2 evidence refs
Operations

No new transaction-monitoring or screening threshold change identified for Morocco this cycle beyond the standing UN-only sanctions implementation.

The OFAC SDN designation is a screening-relevant data point for Moroccan-nationality nexus exposure, but no new Moroccan-origin list or threshold change is indicated this cycle.

2 evidence refs
Audit

The MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation launch gives a dated, multi-year audit-trail reference point for Moroccan AML/CTF effectiveness testing.

Internal audit scope for Moroccan-nexus AML/CTF controls can now anchor to the 27 November 2025 launch date and May 2028 reporting horizon, with the Recommendation 15 Non-Compliant finding as a specific documented control gap to track through that window.

2 evidence refs
Decision lens
MLRO

MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation of Morocco formally launched, running through May 2028, with a standing Non-Compliant finding on virtual assets as a visible gap.

Compliance

Draft Bill 42.25 remains unenacted while an estimated six million informal crypto users operate outside a licensing perimeter.

Legal

An OFAC SDN designation carries a Moroccan-nationality nexus distinct from any Moroccan state sanctions action.

Board

Morocco enters a multi-year MENAFATF effectiveness evaluation while its crypto-asset licensing framework remains in draft.

CTO

A prior-approval licensing regime for crypto-asset service providers in Morocco remains in draft with no enactment before 2027 at the earliest.

Risk

A structural capacity gap between an eight-year-old crypto-asset warning and a six-million-user informal market persists as the draft licensing bill remains unenacted.

Operations

No new transaction-monitoring or screening threshold change identified for Morocco this cycle beyond the standing UN-only sanctions implementation.

Audit

The MENAFATF third-round mutual evaluation launch gives a dated, multi-year audit-trail reference point for Moroccan AML/CTF effectiveness testing.

Shared evidence: 5 refs
Scenario sketches

AMLA direct-supervision transition as a structural reference point

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. As the EU moves from purely national AML supervision toward AMLA direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities under the AMLA Regulation, alongside the directly-applicable AMLR and per-state 6AMLD transposition, non-EEA jurisdictions such as Morocco could see indirect effects through correspondent-banking de-risking pressure or through EU-domiciled obliged entities applying AMLA-driven standards to Moroccan-nexus relationships, even though Morocco itself sits outside the AMLA perimeter. This is architecture-over-incident illustration of a possible transmission channel, not an observed fact or a prediction about Morocco specifically.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

Standing trackers (T1–T6)
TrackerStatusNote
T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architectureno_changeNo material change identified for MA under T1 this cycle.
T2 · EU AML Package / AMLAno_changeMorocco is not an EEA member and is not directly bound by AMLR/6AMLD/AMLA.
T3 · FATF Grey ListwatchMorocco remains off the FATF increased-monitoring list (exited 2023); MENAFATF's 3rd-round mutual evaluation formally launched 27 Nov 2025, running to May 2028.
T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Statusno_changeNo MA-specific beneficial-ownership register development identified this cycle.
T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integritymaterial_changeBAM confirmed continued progress finalising Draft Bill 42.25; MENAFATF's 5th Enhanced FUR rated Morocco Non-Compliant on R.15 (virtual assets).
T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergenceno_changeMorocco has no autonomous sanctions list and implements UN Security Council sanctions only.
Registers

Enforcement actions

  • Morocco submitted (and MENAFATF processed) its 6th Enhanced Follow-Up Report at the 40th MENAFATF Plenary (May 2025), continuing the enhanced-monitoring cycle established since the 2019 Mutual Evaluation, with re-rating requests tracking progress on Recommendations 15, 24, 25, 31, 32 and 38. 15 May 2025
  • FATF's published Morocco follow-up page was updated (page metadata dated December 2025), reaffirming continued enhanced-monitoring status and confirming that Recommendation 32 (cash couriers) and other outstanding items remain unresolved notwithstanding Morocco's 2023 removal from the grey list. 1 Dec 2025
  • Implementation continued of the decree establishing a 'Public Register of UBOs of Companies established in Morocco and Legal Arrangements' and the statutory prohibition on new bearer-share issuance (with mandatory conversion of existing bearer shares to registered form), addressing FATF Recommendation 24/25 deficiencies, though MENAFATF's 5th Enhanced FUR found the electronic BO platform still not fully operational. 15 May 2025

Sanctions changes

  • The European Commission's December 2025 update to the EU high-risk third-country list added Bolivia and the British Virgin Islands and delisted several African jurisdictions, but did not add Morocco, even as regional neighbour Algeria had been added to the same list in June 2025 — a persistent divergence point within North Africa's AML risk classification. 4 Dec 2025
  • Following the UK's January 2024 shift to directly mirror the FATF 'Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring' and 'Call for Action' lists in Schedule 3ZA of the MLRs, subsequent HM Treasury advisory notices (June 2025, October 2025, February 2026) have continued to exclude Morocco from the UK High-Risk Third Countries list, consistent with its non-listing by FATF. 24 Feb 2026

Regulatory horizon (register)

  • Enactment of Morocco's crypto-asset / VASP licensing law
  • Next MENAFATF Enhanced Follow-Up Report / Plenary review of Morocco
  • Implementation of revised EU-Morocco trade protocol on Western Sahara-origin goods
  • Next EU Article 9 high-risk third-country list review cycle

Active schemes

  • [HIGH] Hashish/cocaine transit via Western Sahara ports
  • PEP offshore structuring via BVI/Seychelles/Panama entities
  • Informal crypto adoption despite unresolved regulatory ban
Sources
  1. Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
  2. MENAFATF (endorsed by FATF)
  3. Kingdom of Morocco (Law 43-05), hosted via UNODC CLD
  4. European Commission
  5. HM Treasury (UK Government)
  6. OCCRP
  7. ICIJ
  8. Chainalysis
Coverage gaps
Morocco's cross-border currency/bearer-negotiable-instrument…
Morocco's cross-border currency/bearer-negotiable-instrument declaration system (FATF Recommendation 32) remains only partially compliant: customs authorities lack authority to request further information on discovery of false declarations, and no proportionate/dissuasive sanctions regime attaches to false declarations, in a heavily cash-based economy.
Despite a decree establishing a public UBO register for comp…
Despite a decree establishing a public UBO register for companies and legal arrangements, the electronic platform intended to host beneficial ownership declarations remains incompletely populated and not fully operational, and Morocco has not demonstrated safeguards against nominee shareholder/director misuse.
No operative VASP licensing/supervisory regime exists in Mor…
No operative VASP licensing/supervisory regime exists in Morocco notwithstanding a 2017 central-bank ban; the ban is widely disregarded, evidenced by Morocco's ranking among the region's fastest-growing crypto-adoption markets with activity occurring entirely outside AML/CFT-supervised channels.
Publicly available, English-language reporting on individual…
Publicly available, English-language reporting on individual Moroccan money-laundering prosecutions, convictions, or supervisory financial penalties within the 18-month baseline window is sparse; MENAFATF's own historical MER data shows extremely low ML conviction rates (2 convictions out of 8 judgments over 2008-2016), and no comparable recent statistics were located in this research cycle.

Evidence

Confidence-tiered claims

Bank Al-Maghrib confirmed continued drafting progress since 2025; bill remains unenacted SRC-fim-MA-001
Probable · 1 source
Formally launched via high-level Presidency visit on 27 Nov 2025; runs through May 2028 SRC-fim-MA-002
Probable · 1 source
Designated under Executive Order 13224 as amended, linked to IRGC-Qods Force network SRC-fim-MA-004
Confirmed · 1 source
Off the FATF increased-monitoring (grey) list since 2023 SRC-fim-MA-003
Probable · 1 source
No autonomous sanctions list; implements UN Security Council sanctions only SRC-fim-MA-005
Probable · 1 source