Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.

Financial Integrity Monitor

Thailand TH

Domains (D1–D6)

Sources

Role actions

Horizon <90d

Jurisdiction profile

CleanTier BRisk: IncreasingMixed

AMLA 1999 (amended) with AMLO as FIU/supervisor; Emergency Decree on Digital Asset Businesses 2018 (SEC-regulated VASPs); 2022 NRA underpins 2022-2027 AML/CFT National Strategy; no beneficial ownership registry; DNFBP (real estate, gold/jewellery, casino) supervision remains weak per FATF follow-up findings.

Key deficiencies

No beneficial ownership registry or legal mechanism to record/report BO information
Weak supervision of DNFBPs, especially real estate, gold/jewellery and casino-adjacent sectors
Historically low/underused mutual legal assistance requests relative to risk profile with high-risk neighboring jurisdictions
Technical impediments applying administrative sanctions per FATF assessments
Porous land borders enabling informal cash, migrant and scam-labor movement into Myanmar/Cambodia compounds

Recent developments (18m)

February 2025: Thailand cut electricity, internet and fuel supply to five Myanmar border areas hosting scam compounds
October 2025: US/UK sanctioned Cambodia's Prince Group; Thai and Singapore authorities opened parallel reviews of the group's local assets
October 2025: Royal Thai Police arrested a Chinese national in Bangkok tied to the FINTOCH crypto fraud network
November 2025: OFAC designated Thailand-incorporated Trans Asia International Holding Group Thailand Co Ltd, Troth Star Co Ltd, and Thai national Chamu Sawang for financing Myanmar scam compounds
December 2025: Thai military framed the Thailand-Cambodia border conflict partly as a campaign against scam-center networks
2026: Thailand SEC's 2026-2028 digital asset strategic plan (crypto ETFs, tokenized funds, Travel Rule) advances

Brief

Lead signal

Lead Signal

Read full brief

Lead Signal

Thailand's exposure as an enabler jurisdiction for Myanmar-border cyber-scam finance sharpened considerably this cycle. OFAC designated Trans Asia International Holding Group Thailand Co., Ltd., a Thai-registered corporate vehicle, for facilitating Myanmar-based scam compounds alongside the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, and separately designated Chamu Sawang, a Thai national, as a director and facilitator within the same Myanmar-border scam-compound network. Both designations point to the same underlying architecture: Thai corporate registration and Thai nationals functioning as the legal and administrative scaffolding for scam-compound financing that physically sits across the border in Myanmar. This is not an isolated incident but a structural enabler-jurisdiction pattern, and it sits alongside a second and connected development -- OFAC's April 2026 Scam Center Strike Force action designating sitting Cambodian senator Kok An and 28 associates in a Prince Group network whose compound infrastructure directly implicates the Thailand-Cambodia border corridor as well.

Other Developments

Payment-gateway scrutiny intensifies. The Bank of Thailand has tightened scrutiny of payment gateway providers over illicit FX speculation and unlicensed digital-wallet peer-to-peer channels, including Alipay and WeChat Pay QR-code routes, with approximately 5,000 accounts frozen between February 2025 and May 2026 in connection with unlicensed RMB transfers. This finding rests on a single T3 press source with no Bank of Thailand primary notification retrieved this cycle, capping confidence at Probable, but the scale reported -- thousands of frozen accounts over a fifteen-month span -- indicates sustained rather than episodic enforcement attention to this channel.

Nominee-arrangement legislation remains in the pipeline. A draft amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering Act, cabinet-approved on 25 February 2025, would criminalise nominee arrangements used to circumvent the Foreign Business Act and would broaden the Anti-Money Laundering Office's asset-seizure powers to reach facilitators, not only direct launderers. This amendment is corroborated across two independent law-firm sources but has not yet produced Royal Gazette enactment text, and the expected impact horizon on the regulatory horizon register is set as far out as 2027, reflecting the multi-year uncertainty band on when this reform will actually take effect.

Stablecoin transfer controls under consultation. SEC Thailand has proposed a daily transfer cap of approximately THB 5 million and a ban on third-party-wallet stablecoin transfers, with a public consultation running 11-25 September 2026 and citing money-laundering and cybercrime risk as its rationale. This proposal rests on vendor/aggregator-tier sourcing only, with no SEC Thailand primary consultation paper retrieved this cycle, and the confidence assigned is accordingly Uncertain.

Cross-Monitor Connections

The Thailand-Cambodia border corridor scam-compound architecture connects directly to conflict-finance and state-capture themes tracked elsewhere in this fleet: a sitting Cambodian senator's designation as a scam-center facilitator is a state-capture signal with direct spillover into the Thai border region, illustrating how enabler-jurisdiction exposure in Thailand is inseparable from political-economy dynamics in a neighbouring jurisdiction. The Bank of Thailand's payment-gateway enforcement against unlicensed RMB P2P channels also intersects with world-payments' tracking of cross-border payment-rail integrity, since the same frozen-account population sits at the intersection of unlicensed money-service-business activity and sanctions-adjacent enabler exposure.

Outlook

Thailand's near-term trajectory on sanctions and enabler-jurisdiction exposure is escalating rather than stabilising, driven by the compounding effect of the Trans Asia/Chamu Sawang designations and the Cambodian senator's border-corridor implication landing in close succession. The nominee-arrangement AML amendment's slow legislative path -- cabinet-approved in February 2025 but not expected to produce an enacted instrument before 2027 on current signals -- means the corporate-transparency gap it is designed to close will persist for some time yet. The SEC stablecoin consultation closing 25 September 2026 is the nearest-term fixed date on this brief's horizon and will indicate whether Thailand moves toward formal transfer-layer controls on stablecoin movement.

weekly_brief_draft · JID TH

Domain intelligence (D1–D6)

D1 Sanctions Architecture and Evasion

Sanctions Architecture and Evasion

This cycle produced two connected sanctions-architecture developments bearing directly on Thailand's exposure. OFAC designated Trans Asia International Holding Group Thailand Co., Ltd., a Thai-registered corporate vehicle, for facilitating Myanmar-based cyber-scam compounds operated alongside the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, and separately designated Chamu Sawang, a Thai national, as a director and facilitator within the same Myanmar-border scam-compound network. Both designations illustrate the same underlying architecture: Thai corporate registration and Thai nationals functioning as legal and administrative scaffolding for scam-compound financing physically based across the border in Myanmar. This is an architecture finding, not an isolated incident -- the pattern of using Thai corporate vehicles and Thai nationals to interface with Myanmar-based illicit finance is the analytically significant element, more so than either individual designation on its own.

A second and geographically adjacent designation compounds this picture. OFAC's April 2026 Scam Center Strike Force action designated sitting Cambodian senator Kok An and 28 associates within a Prince Group network, and the compound infrastructure named in that action directly implicates the Thailand-Cambodia border corridor. Read together with the Myanmar-border designations, this cycle's sanctions activity establishes Thailand as sitting at the intersection of two separate but geographically connected scam-compound financing corridors -- one on its western border with Myanmar, one on its eastern border with Cambodia -- each with distinct designated-entity architecture but a shared reliance on cross-border compound infrastructure and local corporate or national facilitation.

The designations are all Confirmed-confidence, T1-sourced directly from OFAC press releases, giving this cycle's sanctions findings a strong evidentiary basis. The Foreign Business Act nominee-arrangement dynamic addressed under Beneficial Ownership below is a related but distinct enabler mechanism, worth reading alongside these designations as part of the same broader picture of how Thai corporate structures interface with cross-border illicit finance.

Outlook

The pattern of designations on both the Myanmar and Cambodia border corridors this cycle suggests continued OFAC attention to Southeast Asian scam-compound financing architecture is likely, with Thai-registered entities and Thai nationals remaining a plausible target category given the enabler role identified in the Trans Asia and Chamu Sawang designations.

D2 Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency

Beneficial Ownership and Corporate Transparency

Globally, the EU AML Package sets the structural direction for beneficial-ownership and corporate-transparency reform: the AML Regulation (AMLR, Reg (EU) 2024/1624) applies directly across the EU, the sixth AML Directive (6AMLD) is transposed per Member State, and the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620) establishes the Anti-Money Laundering Authority, shifting supervision of cross-border obliged entities from purely national authorities toward a hybrid EU-level regime. This architecture is durable structural backdrop rather than a single-cycle development, and it is not the primary subject matter for Thailand, a non-EEA jurisdiction whose corporate-transparency exposure runs through its own domestic legislative pipeline rather than through the EU framework.

In Thailand specifically, the directly relevant development this cycle is a draft amendment to the Anti-Money Laundering Act, cabinet-approved on 25 February 2025, which would criminalise nominee arrangements used to circumvent the Foreign Business Act's foreign-ownership restrictions and would broaden the Anti-Money Laundering Office's asset-seizure powers to reach facilitators of such arrangements, not only direct launderers. This is corroborated across two independent T3 law-firm sources, though no Royal Gazette enactment text has been retrieved, capping confidence at Probable. The amendment targets a structural gap: foreign-investment structuring in Thailand has relied widely on nominee arrangements to satisfy Foreign Business Act thresholds, and the proposed amendment would materially increase criminal and asset-seizure exposure for parties involved in such arrangements, extending Recommendation 24-style beneficial-ownership transparency logic into a distinctly Thai statutory context.

The regulatory horizon register places the expected impact date for this amendment as far out as 2027 with a multi-year uncertainty band, reflecting how much legislative distance remains between cabinet approval and enactment. This should be read as a genuinely open timeline rather than an imminent reform.

Outlook

The nominee-arrangement amendment's slow legislative path means the corporate-transparency gap it targets will likely persist through the near term. Watch for movement through the Office of the Council of State toward a Royal Gazette-published enactment, which would be the concrete signal that this reform has moved from consultation to binding law.

D3 Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators

Enabler Jurisdictions and Professional Facilitators

Thailand's role as an enabler jurisdiction for cross-border illicit finance sharpened on two fronts this cycle. First, the OFAC designations of Trans Asia International Holding Group Thailand Co., Ltd. and the Thai national Chamu Sawang demonstrate direct enabler-jurisdiction exposure: Thai corporate registration and a Thai national functioning as a director were both used as vehicles for cross-border scam-compound finance targeting Myanmar's border region. This is precisely the enabler-jurisdiction pattern this domain exists to track -- not primary illicit conduct occurring within Thailand, but Thai legal and corporate infrastructure being used to facilitate illicit conduct occurring elsewhere.

Second, and separately, the Bank of Thailand has tightened scrutiny of payment gateway providers over illicit FX speculation and unlicensed digital-wallet peer-to-peer channels, including Alipay and WeChat Pay QR-code routes, with approximately 5,000 accounts frozen between February 2025 and May 2026 in connection with unlicensed RMB transfers. This is a domestically-enforced facilitator-channel finding rather than a designated-entity finding, and it rests on a single T3 press source with no Bank of Thailand primary notification retrieved this cycle, capping confidence at Probable. Nonetheless, the scale reported -- thousands of accounts frozen over a fifteen-month span -- indicates the Bank of Thailand is treating unlicensed P2P payment-gateway channels as a sustained enforcement priority rather than an isolated sweep.

Taken together, these two findings describe an enabler-jurisdiction profile with both an outbound dimension (Thai corporate/national facilitation of Myanmar-border scam finance) and an inbound-channel dimension (unlicensed payment-gateway P2P routes used for FX/RMB movement). Absence of a broader BOT primary notification limits how far this second finding can be corroborated this cycle, and that gap is worth flagging explicitly as an evidentiary limitation rather than treating the Probable-confidence finding as settled.

Outlook

Continued Bank of Thailand enforcement against unlicensed payment-gateway channels is plausible given the reported scale of account freezes to date. A primary BOT notification, if and when retrieved, would allow this finding's confidence to be reassessed; until then, the finding should be read at its current Probable tier.

D4 Conflict Finance

Not covered

Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D5 Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

Crypto, Digital Assets, and Financial Innovation

Thailand's digital-asset regulatory posture is directly relevant to this domain through SEC Thailand's proposal to impose a daily transfer cap of approximately THB 5 million on stablecoin movements and to ban third-party-wallet stablecoin transfers via licensed digital-asset operators. A public consultation on this proposal ran 11-25 September 2026, and the rationale cited is money-laundering and cybercrime risk -- squarely a financial-integrity concern rather than a purely market-structure one. This proposal rests on vendor/aggregator-tier sourcing only, with no SEC Thailand primary consultation paper retrieved this cycle, and the confidence assigned is accordingly Uncertain; it should not be read as a settled or imminent rule.

This Thailand-specific development sits against a global backdrop of FATF Recommendation 15 (new technologies) guidance on virtual-asset service providers, which the proposal's obligation framing explicitly references at the consultation stage. The transfer-cap and same-owner-wallet-verification approach, if adopted, would represent a transfer-layer rather than issuance-layer control mechanism -- restricting how stablecoins move between wallets rather than who may issue them -- and this distinguishes Thailand's regulatory instinct here from jurisdictions that legislate primarily at the point of stablecoin issuance.

The uncertainty attached to this finding is itself analytically significant: a regulatory proposal that has not been corroborated by a primary regulator source, and that remains at consultation stage, represents exactly the kind of forward-looking regulatory signal that this domain exists to flag early, even while its ultimate adoption and final form remain genuinely unresolved.

Outlook

The consultation closed 25 September 2026; the outcome will determine whether Thailand formalises transfer-layer stablecoin controls. Retrieval of a SEC Thailand primary consultation document would materially improve confidence in this finding and should be prioritised in subsequent research cycles.

D6 Compliance Technology & Active Defence

Not covered

Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D7 AML/CTF Regime

Not covered

AML/CTF Regime is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

D8 Commercial Activity

Not covered

Commercial Activity is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.

Regulatory horizon

Consultation2026-Q4 · ±quarter

SEC Thailand stablecoin transfer-restriction rulemaking

Deposits/withdrawals via licensed platforms would need to move to/from same-customer wallets subject to daily caps.

Source

Consultation2027 · ±multi_year

AMLA amendment targeting nominee arrangements

AMLO would gain seizure powers over facilitators' assets, and nominee arrangements circumventing the Foreign Business Act would become an explicit predicate offense.

Source

2 dated · 3 pending date · baseline financial-integrity-2026-07-05

Role action cards

MLRO

OFAC designated Thai-registered entities and a Thai national as Myanmar-border scam-compound facilitators.

Screening lists should be checked against the Trans Asia International Holding Group Thailand Co., Ltd. and Chamu Sawang designations; correspondent and customer relationships with Thai corporate vehicles active near the Myanmar border merit enhanced scrutiny given the enabler pattern this cycle's designations establish.

2 evidence refs

Compliance

Bank of Thailand tightened scrutiny of payment gateways over illicit FX/USDT-adjacent RMB P2P channels, freezing approximately 5,000 accounts.

Payment-company and bank compliance functions with Thai payment-gateway exposure should review controls around unlicensed digital-wallet P2P channels, including Alipay/WeChat Pay QR routes, given sustained enforcement attention over a fifteen-month period.

1 evidence refs

Legal

A draft AML Act amendment would criminalise Foreign Business Act nominee arrangements and broaden AMLO asset-seizure powers to facilitators.

Legal counsel advising on Thai corporate structuring involving nominee arrangements to satisfy Foreign Business Act thresholds should track this amendment's progress; cabinet approval was given 25 February 2025 but the regulatory horizon register places likely impact as far out as 2027.

1 evidence refs

Board

Sanctions exposure on both the Thailand-Myanmar and Thailand-Cambodia border corridors escalated this cycle.

Board-level risk oversight should note that Thailand now sits at the intersection of two separate OFAC-designated scam-compound financing corridors this cycle, representing a material reputational and counterparty-risk consideration for any institution with Southeast Asian border-region exposure.

3 evidence refs

CTO

SEC Thailand proposed stablecoin transfer caps and a third-party-wallet ban, consultation closing 25 September 2026.

Technology teams supporting licensed digital-asset operators in Thailand should track this consultation's outcome, as a same-owner-wallet verification requirement and daily transfer cap would require architecture changes to wallet-verification and transaction-limiting systems if adopted.

1 evidence refs

Risk

Thailand's jurisdiction risk direction is assessed as increasing, driven by D1, D3 and D5 signals this cycle.

Risk functions should treat Thailand's enabler-jurisdiction and cross-border-facilitation exposure as trending upward this cycle, reflecting the combined weight of the sanctions designations, payment-gateway enforcement, and stablecoin-regulatory consultation.

4 evidence refs

Operations

No material change for this persona this cycle.

No material change for this persona this cycle

Audit

Bank of Thailand payment-gateway enforcement finding rests on a single T3 press source with no primary BOT notification retrieved.

Internal audit should note the evidentiary gap on the payment-gateway/RMB-transfer finding: the approximately 5,000-account freeze figure is Probable-confidence pending retrieval of a Bank of Thailand primary notification, and control-testing scope referencing this finding should be calibrated accordingly.

1 evidence refs

Decision lens

MLRO

OFAC designated Thai-registered entities and a Thai national as Myanmar-border scam-compound facilitators.

Compliance

Bank of Thailand tightened scrutiny of payment gateways over illicit FX/USDT-adjacent RMB P2P channels, freezing approximately 5,000 accounts.

Legal

A draft AML Act amendment would criminalise Foreign Business Act nominee arrangements and broaden AMLO asset-seizure powers to facilitators.

Board

Sanctions exposure on both the Thailand-Myanmar and Thailand-Cambodia border corridors escalated this cycle.

CTO

SEC Thailand proposed stablecoin transfer caps and a third-party-wallet ban, consultation closing 25 September 2026.

Risk

Thailand's jurisdiction risk direction is assessed as increasing, driven by D1, D3 and D5 signals this cycle.

Operations

No material change for this persona this cycle.

Audit

Bank of Thailand payment-gateway enforcement finding rests on a single T3 press source with no primary BOT notification retrieved.

Shared evidence: 4 refs

Scenario sketches

Border-corridor enabler escalation scenario

Illustrative scenario: continued OFAC designation activity against Thai-registered entities and nationals facilitating Myanmar-border scam compounds could, over successive cycles, prompt Thai authorities to accelerate domestic enforcement against corporate registration abuse, potentially converging with the nominee-arrangement AML amendment's asset-seizure provisions once enacted. This is an illustrative structural sketch, not an observed development or a prediction of Thai legislative behaviour.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

EU AML Package / AMLA supervisory transition — illustrative orientation

Illustrative scenario: as the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620) moves the EU toward direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities, alongside the directly-applicable AMLR (Reg 2024/1624) and per-state 6AMLD transposition, the supervisory perimeter for entities with EU-facing operations could tighten in ways that indirectly affect non-EEA jurisdictions like Thailand where EU-linked obliged entities maintain corporate presence. This is architecture-over-incident illustrative orientation under the intelligence register, not a prediction or observed fact, and is not itself a Thailand-specific finding.

Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.

Standing trackers (T1–T6)

Tracker	Status	Note
T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture	stable	No TH-specific Russian sanctions-evasion signal found this cycle.
T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA	no_change	Not applicable — TH is outside the EEA.
T3 · FATF Grey List	stable	Thailand not on the FATF grey list following the 19 June 2026 Plenary.
T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status	mixed	Disputed nominee predicate-offence provision status; DBD reportedly cross-referring nominee files to police/AMLO administratively.
T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity	improving	SEC finalised crypto Travel Rule; stablecoin same-owner/daily-cap draft in consultation.
T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence	stable	No TH-specific autonomous sanctions-listing divergence identified this cycle.

Registers

Enforcement actions

OFAC designated two Thailand-incorporated companies and a Thai national under the Burma-EO14014/Cyber4 sanctions programs for developing and financing the Tai Chang scam compound in partnership with the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), concurrent with the launch of the DOJ Scam Center Strike Force. 12 Nov 2025
Thai police arrested a fugitive Chinese national in Bangkok's Chatuchak district, one of five FINTOCH executives charged by Chinese authorities for a high-yield crypto fraud that laundered USDT through nested TRON services before cashing out at sanctioned Huione Pay. 29 Oct 2025
Thailand cut electricity, internet access and fuel supply to Myanmar border areas suspected of housing scam-center operations, an administrative disruption measure following heightened public attention to cross-border trafficking of scam-compound labor. 5 Feb 2025
Following US and UK sanctions on Cambodia's Prince Group chairman Chen Zhi, Thai authorities opened a review of the group's local asset-seizure process and legal proceedings in coordination with US counterparts, in parallel with a Singapore police inquiry. 18 Oct 2025

Sanctions changes

OFAC added Thailand-incorporated Trans Asia International Holding Group Thailand Co. Ltd., Troth Star Co. Ltd., and Thai national Chamu Sawang to the SDN list under Burma-related/Cyber-related sanctions programs for financing DKBA-linked scam compounds. 12 Nov 2025
The UK (FCDO/OFSI) and US jointly sanctioned Cambodia's Prince Group and Chairman Chen Zhi on 14 October 2025 (later expanded 26 March 2026 to add Xinbi and further associates), freezing UK property including a £12 million North London mansion; the action triggered a Thai regulatory/asset-tracing review even though no Thai entity was directly designated by the UK in this action. 14 Oct 2025
FinCEN designated Huione Group, the principal Cambodia-based crypto payment/guarantee platform used to cash out Thailand-linked fraud proceeds (including the FINTOCH scheme), as a primary money laundering concern under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, cutting it off from US correspondent banking. 14 Oct 2025

Regulatory horizon (register)

Thailand SEC 2026-2028 digital asset capital-market strategic plan
Thailand VASP Travel Rule implementation
Thailand's next FATF/APG mutual evaluation (5th round)

Active schemes

[CRITICAL] Thailand as transit/enabler node for Mekong scam-compound economy
[HIGH] USDT/TRON nested laundering via Thailand-based off-ramps
[HIGH] Beneficial-ownership opacity enabling shell-company layering
[CRITICAL] Thai front companies financing Myanmar armed-group scam compounds

Sources

Coverage gaps

Thailand has no legal mechanism to record, verify or publicl…

Thailand has no legal mechanism to record, verify or publicly report beneficial ownership information for legal persons; only basic incorporation data is available via the National Business Registration Portal.

Real estate, gold/jewellery and car-dealer DNFBP sectors rem…

Real estate, gold/jewellery and car-dealer DNFBP sectors remain under-supervised for AML/CFT compliance, a deficiency flagged in the 2017 APG MER and only partially remediated by the 2023 6th Follow-Up Report.

Thailand's international cooperation framework, while compre…

Thailand's international cooperation framework, while comprehensive on paper, has historically not been used in line with its risk profile, with low formal mutual legal assistance request volumes directed at high-risk neighboring jurisdictions (Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos) despite porous, high-traffic borders.

No confirmed on-site date for Thailand's next FATF/APG 5th-r…

No confirmed on-site date for Thailand's next FATF/APG 5th-round mutual evaluation was located in the FATF public assessments calendar during this baseline, nor confirmation of a post-2022 National Risk Assessment cycle; the 2022 NRA remains the most recent publicly referenced risk assessment.

Evidence

Confidence-tiered claims

Undeclared crypto-linked assets of a public official; SEC Thailand, AMLO and NACC invited to provide information on 7 October 2026 SRC-fim-TH-001

Probable · 1 source

Whether nominee shareholding under the Foreign Business Act was criminalised as a money-laundering predicate offence; one source asserts it entered force, another states it was not in the Cabinet-approved bill and lapsed with December 2025 House dissolution SRC-fim-TH-003

Disputed · 1 source

Originator/beneficiary data collection on digital-asset transfers, enhanced data above THB 30,000, 5-year record retention, and self-hosted wallet ownership verification; effective 27 February 2027, per SEC Notification No. Sor Thor. 9/2569 dated 25 August 2026 SRC-fim-TH-008

Probable · 1 source

Assets linked to Cambodia-based scam compounds, laundered through Thai shell companies and property purchases, including a named Cambodian senator and bank chairman SRC-fim-TH-011

Probable · 1 source

Cash deposits, banknote exchange and foreign-banknote purchase/sale/exchange, superseding BOT Notification No. 16/2569; main provisions effective 15 October 2026, Enhanced Due Diligence for certain legal-entity categories effective 15 April 2027 SRC-fim-TH-010

Probable · 1 source

Finance-ministry-authorised money changers under the Exchange Control Act, raising standards, mandating upgrades for existing licensees, and freezing new applications through 2027; consultation ran 19 August to 18 September 2026 SRC-fim-TH-013

Probable · 1 source

Not on the FATF Jurisdictions under Increased Monitoring list published following the 19 June 2026 Plenary (22 jurisdictions listed); no newer FATF-adopted mutual evaluation report than the APG/IMF 2007 assessment was located SRC-fim-TH-006

Probable · 1 source