D1 Sanctions
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.
Michigan operates entirely within the federal BSA/AML, OFAC-sanctions and FinCEN CTA architecture; the state layer consists of Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs (LARA) corporate formation (no beneficial-ownership verification), DIFS licensing of money transmitters under the Uniform Money Services Act, and Attorney General consumer-protection alerts on crypto fraud.
United States federal law that applies in United States – Michigan is covered once, on the United States page. This page covers United States – Michigan’s own layer: its own law, regulators and enforcement.
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Beneficial Ownership is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Enabler Jurisdictions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
In Michigan, the digital-asset signal this cycle runs through a litigation thread rather than a crypto-native regulatory action. A Michigan state court issued a preliminary injunction against KalshiEx LLC, with geofencing requirements and a penalty of 500,000 dollars per day, over sports-event contracts that the state alleges amount to unlicensed gambling under the Lawful Sports Betting Act, Public Act 149 of 2019. KalshiEx operates in partnership with Coinbase Financial Markets Inc., and it is that partnership, not the underlying sports-event contract product itself, that gives this matter its crypto-adjacency. Coinbase Financial Markets has, separately and preemptively, sued the State of Michigan in federal court; that suit continues. The structural question the pairing raises is one of characterisation: whether a prediction-market product distributed in partnership with a regulated crypto-asset entity is a gambling product subject to state licensing, a money-transmission or derivatives product subject to a different regulatory lens, or something the existing statutory categories in Michigan do not cleanly capture. No primary court-docket record was retrieved this cycle; the available substrate is press reporting of the injunction and of the Coinbase filing, and that limitation is recorded rather than papered over.
The second, and structurally more durable, D5-relevant thread is House Bill 5544, the Money Transmission Modernization Act. The bill passed the Michigan House 97-10 on 25 June 2026 and was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance, Insurance, and Consumer Protection on 1 July 2026, with no further Senate action recorded as of this cycle. It would repeal the 2006 Money Transmission Services Act, MCL 487.1001 through 487.1047, and replace it with a licensing, bonding, and reporting regime built on the Conference of State Bank Supervisors model law. Material to the digital-asset lens, the bill carries a virtual-currency exclusion clause that would carve non-custodial, non-exchange virtual-currency activity out of the state money-transmission licensing perimeter. This is the kind of provision that determines, at a structural level, which crypto-asset business models require a Michigan money-transmitter license and which do not; it is architecture, not incident, and its eventual final text will matter more to the state's crypto-asset perimeter than any single enforcement action.
Taken together, the two threads illustrate a jurisdiction where crypto-adjacent financial innovation is being tested against two different regulatory frames at once: an established gambling-law frame being applied to a prediction-market product with a crypto-exchange partner, and a money-transmission licensing frame that is itself mid-rewrite and explicitly contemplates carving out certain virtual-currency activity. Michigan has not, this cycle, taken a crypto-native enforcement action in the conventional sense; what it has done is apply an adjacent statute to a crypto-adjacent product while leaving the money-transmission statute that would otherwise govern many such products in legislative limbo.
Both threads remain open. The preliminary injunction against KalshiEx is interlocutory, not a final ruling, and the Coinbase Financial Markets preemption suit in federal court was ongoing as at this cycle; which theory prevails, state gambling law or federal preemption, will determine whether this category of product is treated in Michigan as licensed gambling, as a financial-innovation product falling outside that frame, or as something requiring a new statutory answer. HB 5544 had not been enacted as of this cycle and sat before the Senate Finance, Insurance, and Consumer Protection Committee; whether its virtual-currency exclusion clause survives Senate consideration intact, is narrowed, or is broadened will shape the money-transmission licensing exposure of crypto-asset operators in the state going forward. Neither outcome can be read from the record available this cycle, and no inference beyond what is stated here should be drawn from the pending status of either matter.
Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Michigan's AML/CTF regime sits, structurally, on two layers that remained unchanged this cycle in their current form, with one of those layers now mid-overhaul through pending legislation. The operative layer is state money-transmitter licensing, administered by the Department of Insurance and Financial Services under the 2006 Money Transmission Services Act, MCL 487.1001 through 487.1047. DIFS guidance continues to warn licensees that failure to renew in a timely manner may prevent a firm from conducting money transmission in the state, underscoring that licensing currency, not merely initial authorisation, is the operative control point. Beneath that state layer sits the federal Bank Secrecy Act framework: money-services-business registration with FinCEN, and the associated Suspicious Activity Report and Currency Transaction Report filing obligations that apply regardless of state licensing status. No change to this two-layer architecture was identified this cycle.
What has changed, in status if not yet in effect, is the statutory basis for the state layer. House Bill 5544, the Money Transmission Modernization Act, passed the Michigan House of Representatives 97-10 on 25 June 2026 and was referred to the Senate Committee on Finance, Insurance, and Consumer Protection on 1 July 2026. As of this cycle, no further Senate action had been recorded. The bill would repeal the 2006 Act in full and replace it with a licensing, bonding, and reporting regime based on the Conference of State Bank Supervisors model law, a template that a number of other states have adopted or are adopting in parallel. This is a structural development rather than an incident: it concerns the architecture a licensee must comply with, not a single enforcement episode, and the ratified designation language for FATF grey-list, EU high-risk, or sanctions status has no application here, since this is sub-national licensing modernisation, not a mutual-evaluation or sanctions-list action.
The AML/CTF significance of HB 5544 is primarily structural and prospective. Replacing a 2006-vintage, bespoke state statute with a model-law-based regime tends to standardise licensing, bonding, and examination practice across states that adopt the same template, which has downstream implications for how multi-state money-services businesses structure their compliance programs. The bill's virtual-currency exclusion clause is the most consequential single provision from an AML-architecture perspective, since it defines the boundary of what counts as money transmission subject to the state's licensing and, by extension, its state-level compliance expectations, for virtual-currency activity that is non-custodial and non-exchange in nature. Until the bill is enacted, however, the 2006 Act remains the operative instrument, and DIFS examination and licensing practice under it continues on its existing basis.
HB 5544 had not been enacted as of this cycle and remained before the Senate Committee on Finance, Insurance, and Consumer Protection, with no further action recorded beyond the 1 July 2026 referral. Whether the bill advances un-amended, is amended, or stalls in committee will determine whether Michigan's money-transmission licensing regime converts to the CSBS model-law basis and, with it, how the virtual-currency exclusion clause is ultimately drawn. Until enactment, the existing two-layer structure, state MTL licensing under the 2006 Act beneath the federal BSA/FinCEN framework, remains the governing architecture, and no change to SAR, CTR, or registration obligations under that existing structure was identified this cycle.
Commercial Activity is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
The current SAR, CTR, and MSB-registration obligations continue on their existing basis under the 2006 Money Transmission Services Act. Enactment of HB 5544 would not take effect on the timeline visible this cycle, so no immediate filing-threshold change is indicated, but the bill is a structural development worth tracking given its CSBS model-law basis and virtual-currency exclusion clause.
A firm licensed as a money transmitter in Michigan should track this bill's progress, since the replacement regime and its virtual-currency exclusion clause would alter the licensing basis for crypto-adjacent money-services activity if enacted. The existing 2006 Act and DIFS licensing renewal practice remain the operative control framework in the interim.
Both the state gambling-law theory underlying the KalshiEx injunction and the federal preemption theory underlying the Coinbase Financial Markets suit were unresolved as at this cycle. Only press reporting of the filings and order was available; no primary court-docket record was retrieved, which should be noted when assessing litigation exposure for similarly structured products distributed in partnership with a crypto-asset entity.
These are two distinct structural threads rather than a single incident: a pending legislative rewrite of the licensing basis for money transmitters, and an unresolved court dispute over how a prediction-market product with a crypto-exchange partner should be characterised under existing gambling law. Neither has reached a final resolution as at this cycle.
The eventual scope of the exclusion clause has direct architectural implications for which crypto-asset business models require state money-transmitter licensure in Michigan, separate from the unresolved KalshiEx/Coinbase Financial Markets litigation, which concerns a different statutory frame (gambling law) rather than money-transmission licensing itself.
Concentration risk exists for any firm whose Michigan business model depends on either the current money-transmission statute remaining in force unchanged or on the KalshiEx/Coinbase Financial Markets characterisation questions resolving in a particular direction; neither outcome is yet determinable.
DIFS licensing renewal and federal BSA/FinCEN SAR/CTR filing obligations continue under the existing 2006 Money Transmission Services Act basis; no operational threshold or workflow change is indicated by HB 5544 at this stage, since the bill remained unenacted as at this cycle.
Audit scope for Michigan-licensed money transmitters should continue to test licence renewal timeliness against DIFS requirements under the current statute; no additional control-testing scope is indicated by HB 5544 pending its enactment.
Michigan money-transmission licensing architecture (DIFS MTL plus federal BSA/FinCEN layer) is unchanged, while HB 5544 would replace its statutory basis.
HB 5544 continues through the Michigan Senate and would repeal and replace the 2006 Money Transmission Services Act with a CSBS model-law-based regime.
A Michigan state court injunction against KalshiEx and a parallel federal preemption suit by Coinbase Financial Markets raise an unresolved state-versus-federal characterisation question for crypto-adjacent prediction-market products.
Michigan is mid-overhaul on its money-transmission statute while simultaneously litigating the boundary between gambling law and crypto-adjacent financial innovation.
Pending Michigan legislation (HB 5544) carries a virtual-currency exclusion clause that would define which crypto-asset activity falls inside state money-transmission licensing.
Two concurrent, unresolved Michigan threads, a licensing-statute rewrite and a gambling-law-versus-preemption dispute, both bear on exposure for crypto-adjacent financial-innovation products.
No change to current Michigan money-transmission licensing or filing thresholds this cycle.
DIFS guidance continues to flag licence-renewal timeliness as a control point for continued money-transmission authority in Michigan.
As an illustrative orientation only, consider how a state-level transition from a bespoke 2006-vintage money transmission statute to a CSBS model-law-based regime, as contemplated by pending Michigan legislation, could in principle interact with the virtual-currency exclusion clause such a bill carries. If the exclusion is drawn narrowly, non-custodial and non-exchange virtual-currency activity could still fall inside the licensing perimeter depending on how a given business model is structured; if drawn broadly, a wider range of crypto-adjacent activity could sit outside state money-transmission licensing while remaining subject only to the federal BSA/FinCEN layer. This is architecture-level illustration of a possible structural mechanism, not an observed fact or a prediction of how the pending bill will ultimately be drawn or enacted.
Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.
As a standing illustrative orientation, consider how the ongoing transition from purely national AML supervision toward AMLA direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities, under the AMLA Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1620), alongside the directly applicable AML Regulation (Reg (EU) 2024/1624) and per-state sixth AML Directive transposition, could in principle reshape the supervisory and evasion landscape for cross-border entities over time. This is architecture-over-incident illustration of a possible structural mechanism operating at EU level; it is not a prediction and not an observed fact, and it is not specific to Michigan, which sits outside the EU AML Package perimeter entirely.
Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.
| Tracker | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture | no_change | No material change surfaced this cycle; not actively re-swept. |
| T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA | no_change | No material change surfaced this cycle; not actively re-swept. |
| T3 · FATF Grey List | no_change | No material change surfaced this cycle; not actively re-swept. |
| T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status | no_change | No material change surfaced this cycle. |
| T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity | watch | US-MI's HB 5544 continues through the Senate; would bring crypto exchange/custody activity within the state MSB licensing perimeter via the CSBS model law's virtual-currency provisions. |
| T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence | no_change | No material change surfaced this cycle. |