D1 Sanctions
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Not every instrument is backed by its official text yet. At least one law or rulebook covered here has no official source (tier 1) retrieved for it yet. No finding on this page is shown with confidence above “Probable” until stronger sources are retrieved.
Utah operates within the federal U.S.
United States federal law that applies in United States – Utah is covered once, on the United States page. This page covers United States – Utah’s own layer: its own law, regulators and enforcement.
Sanctions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Beneficial Ownership is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Enabler Jurisdictions is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Conflict Finance is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Utah's HB 72, the Virtual Currency Kiosk Regulation, is the defining development in the state's digital-asset integrity posture this cycle. Effective 6 May 2026, the new Utah Code chapter requires operators of virtual currency kiosks, commonly known as crypto ATMs, to observe graduated daily transaction limits, provide mandatory fraud-prevention disclosures, and file annual reports listing every kiosk location with the Division of Consumer Protection. The regulatory lever chosen here is instructive: this is a consumer-protection and deceptive-practices framework, administered by DCP, rather than an extension of AML licensing obligations under the Money Transmitter Act.
That distinction matters because it sits against a second, unchanged feature of Utah's crypto architecture: the 2020 amendment to Section 7-25-102(9)(b), which places the exclusion of standalone blockchain-token activity, node operation, protocol development, and token-for-token exchange, directly in the statutory definition of money transmission. The practical effect is that Utah has built a two-track approach to crypto-channel risk. The retail cash-to-crypto conversion point, where consumer fraud risk concentrates, now carries a real, binding disclosure and reporting regime. The underlying token infrastructure layer, where no legal tender touches the transaction, remains outside money-transmission licensing altogether. This is a coherent, if narrow, design choice rather than a sign of regulatory inattention, though it is worth noting that the token-exclusion language itself was sourced this cycle from secondary commercial-law commentary rather than independently confirmed against the primary statutory text.
A further point of contact for the digital-asset space is HB 141, the disputed International Money Transmission Amendments, which would impose a 2 percent tax on international money transmissions from 1 January 2027. While not crypto-specific, licensed money transmitters handling any international transfer, including those that touch crypto-kiosk cash-out flows routed internationally, would be affected if the bill is confirmed enacted. Sourcing on its final status remains genuinely contested between a public-radio account reporting failure and a legislative-tracking aggregator reporting passage, and this brief does not resolve that conflict.
The kiosk consumer-protection regime is now in force and is unlikely to see near-term legislative revision; the open question is how actively the Division of Consumer Protection enforces the transaction-limit and disclosure requirements against a dispersed, multi-operator kiosk network. On the token-exclusion side, the carve-out at Section 7-25-102(9)(b) is a stable fixture as scheduled, but primary verification against the statute itself remains outstanding and should be prioritised before any further confidence upgrade. The disputed status of HB 141 is the single largest near-term uncertainty touching crypto-adjacent payment flows in the state; its resolution, whenever primary confirmation arrives, will determine whether a new cost layer attaches to kiosk-linked international remittance activity from 2027.
Compliance Technology & Active Defence is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
Utah's AML/CTF architecture of record continues to be the Money Transmitter Act, administered by the Department of Financial Institutions, which conditions licensure on bonding, net-worth, and comprehensive AML/BSA compliance programs. This is the state's sole AML/CFT touchpoint; Utah has no standalone AML/CFT statute separate from the money-transmission licensing framework. A 2020 amendment to Section 7-25-102(9)(b) carves standalone blockchain-token activity out of the definition of money transmission, meaning crypto-to-crypto exchange and custody that never touches legal tender sits outside this licensing-based AML regime. This should be read as a deliberate statutory boundary rather than a gap arising from regulatory inattention, notwithstanding that the carve-out itself rests on secondary-source commentary rather than independently retrieved primary statutory text this cycle.
Separately, Utah enacted HB 72, a virtual-currency-kiosk consumer-protection statute effective 6 May 2026, which imposes transaction limits, disclosure duties, and location-reporting requirements on crypto-ATM operators. This sits structurally alongside, not inside, the Money Transmitter Act's AML/BSA program requirement: it is administered by the Division of Consumer Protection as a deceptive-practices matter, not folded into DFI's AML licensing supervision. The practical reading is that Utah is narrowing a consumer-facing gap in the crypto-kiosk channel without altering the broader AML licensing perimeter or its crypto-token exclusion.
The most consequential open item in the state's AML-adjacent legislative activity is HB 141, the International Money Transmission Amendments, which would impose a 2 percent tax on international money transmissions from 1 January 2027, collected and remitted quarterly by licensed money transmitters. It passed the Utah House 58-15 on 10 February 2026. Its final Senate and gubernatorial disposition is disputed: a public-radio source reports the bill failed to become law this session, while a legislative-tracking aggregator records it as enacted. This is treated as an unresolved sourcing conflict rather than a confirmed outcome in either direction, pending confirmation from the Legislature's own bill-status record.
At the international level, Laos remains under FATF increased monitoring per the 13 February 2026 plenary list, with no contrary signal identified this cycle and the next FATF plenary outcome, expected October 2026, not yet available. This tracker item carries no direct Utah nexus but is retained as standing global watch-list context relevant to any Utah-licensed entity with Laos-linked counterparty exposure.
The near-term trajectory for Utah's AML regime is one of structural stability punctuated by one live uncertainty: the enactment status of HB 141. If confirmed enacted, licensed money transmitters would face a new tax-collection and quarterly-remittance reporting duty from 1 January 2027, adding a compliance-operations burden distinct from, but adjacent to, their existing AML/BSA program obligations under the Money Transmitter Act. Primary-source confirmation from the Utah Legislature's own records, rather than reliance on conflicting secondary reporting, is the necessary next step before this can be treated as a confirmed finding. The crypto-token exclusion at Section 7-25-102(9)(b) and the general MTA licensing framework are both expected to remain stable as scheduled, absent any further legislative action identified in this cycle.
Commercial Activity is not yet covered for this jurisdiction in this report.
HB 72 creates new disclosure and reporting duties for crypto-kiosk operators administered outside the AML licensing track; the Money Transmitter Act's crypto-token exclusion remains unchanged, so SAR-trigger and licensing exposure for token-only activity is unaffected.
If enacted, HB 141 would impose a new 2 percent tax-collection and quarterly-remittance duty from 2027-01-01 on Utah-licensed money transmitters; the bill's final status is contested between sources and not yet confirmed.
No material change for this persona this cycle
This is a deliberate, durable policy design rather than a capacity gap, relevant to institutions with Utah kiosk or money-transmission exposure.
Node operation, protocol development, and token-for-token exchange not involving legal tender continue to sit outside AML licensing scope in Utah, a stable architectural fact for platform design relying on that boundary.
Both developments touch crypto-adjacent payment flows; the kiosk law is confirmed and in force, while the remittance tax bill's enactment status is an open sourcing conflict requiring primary confirmation.
Operational workflows for Utah-based kiosk operations should reflect the new disclosure, transaction-limit, and annual-reporting requirements effective 2026-05-06.
Audit trail documentation relying on the Section 7-25-102(9)(b) exclusion should note it is currently sourced to secondary commentary only, pending primary statutory confirmation.
Utah kiosk consumer-protection law takes effect alongside an unchanged AML licensing carve-out for standalone crypto-token activity.
Disputed enactment status of HB 141 leaves a compliance-operations question open for international-remittance-handling licensees.
No material change this cycle.
Utah is tightening consumer-facing crypto-kiosk oversight while preserving its narrow AML licensing perimeter for token-only activity.
Standalone blockchain-token activity remains outside Utah money-transmission licensing under the 2020 statutory carve-out.
A new kiosk consumer-protection regime and a disputed remittance tax bill are the two live Utah developments this cycle.
Kiosk operators now face graduated transaction limits and annual location-reporting duties to Utah DCP.
The statutory basis for Utah's crypto-token AML exclusion has not been independently verified against primary text this cycle.
As an illustrative orientation exercise only: the structural move from purely national AML supervision toward AMLA direct and indirect supervision of cross-border obliged entities, operating alongside the directly applicable AMLR and per-state 6AMLD transposition, could over time reshape how cross-border obliged entities are supervised and how evasion patterns adapt to a more harmonised EU-level perimeter. This is architecture-over-incident framing describing a possible structural mechanism, not an observed fact, and has no direct US-UT nexus; it is retained here as standing orientation context only.
Illustrative scenario for analytical orientation only. Not compliance advice, not a prediction, and not a statement of observed fact.
| Tracker | Status | Note |
|---|---|---|
| T1 · Russian Sanctions-Evasion Architecture | no_change | |
| T2 · EU AML Package / AMLA | no_change | |
| T3 · FATF Grey List | watch | Laos remains under FATF increased monitoring per the 13 February 2026 plenary list; Cambodia remains off the grey list (removed February 2023), no contrary signal this cycle. Next FATF plenary (October 2026) outcome not yet available. |
| T4 · Beneficial-Ownership Register Status | no_change | |
| T5 · Crypto & Digital-Asset Integrity | material_change | Utah's HB 72 virtual-currency-kiosk consumer-protection regime is a US-UT-specific incremental development in state-level crypto-channel integrity controls; no MiCA-level or other cross-jurisdictional movement confirmed this cycle. |
| T6 · Sanctions Regime Divergence | no_change |